Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the Finished Image Ignores the Art in the Details by Williams, Karen D.
American University Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 1 Article 4
2008
Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the
Finished Image Ignores the Art in the Details
Karen D. Williams
The American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams, Karen D. “Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the Finished Image Ignores the Art in the Details.” American
University Law Review 58, no. 1 (October 2008): 169-206.
Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the Finished Image Ignores
the Art in the Details
Abstract
Courts initial reactions play a major role in the assessment of copyright protection. A quick recognition of
pictorial quality can result in an easy finding of originality. Based upon the extremely low threshold, such a
quick summation is not surprising or necessarily refutable. However, the blanket assumption of a pictorial
quality in photography creates a disparity in copyright protection for works of graphic design, like maps,
which may not emit that immediate pictorial or aesthetic quality but may still employ creative choice. Those
works that “scream” their pictorial nature get cursory review while the more subtle are being categorized as
compilations and subjected to review more akin to the patent standard of novelty than the copyright standard
of originality. Professor Christine Haight Farley has noted that “photographs are at once able to be seen as the
expression of the photographer who made it, but also as a direct transcription of nature.” In order to
streamline copyright protection for visual works, the dual nature of other visual works must also gain such
recognition.
Keywords
Copyright protection, Visual works, Front-end approach, End product approach
This comment is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol58/iss1/4
  
 
169 
                                                          
DISPARITY IN COPYRIGHT PROTECTION: 
FOCUS ON THE FINISHED IMAGE IGNORES 
THE ART IN THE DETAILS 
KAREN D. WILLIAMS*
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction.........................................................................................171 
 I.  Background ..............................................................................174 
 A. Subject Matter and Limitations on Copyright 
Protection ...........................................................................174 
 B. Originality Is the Touchstone of Copyright Law ..............176 
 1. Originality is a very low threshold, requiring only a 
small indication of creativity.........................................176 
 2. Courts recognize that graphic works may warrant 
copyright protection .....................................................179 
 3. The issue of authorship in conjunction with the 
camera has led courts to a cursory review of 
originality in photography............................................182 
 II. Courts Take Two Approaches in Analyzing the Originality 
of Visual Works ..........................................................................184 
 A. The Front-end Approach Predominates in 
Photography Cases .............................................................185 
 B. The End-product Approach Predominates in Graphic 
Works Cases ........................................................................186 
 
 
 
 * Editor-in-Chief, American University Law Review, Volume 58; J.D. Candidate, 
May 2009, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., Journalism and Mass 
Communication, 2002, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Many thanks to 
Professor Peter Jaszi for our thought-provoking conversations and his comments.  
Thank you to the Volume 57 and 58 staffs, especially my Note and Comment Editor, 
Debra Franzese.  Finally, I am grateful to my family and friends for their endless 
encouragement and support. 
  
170 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:169 
 III. The Fourth Circuit Applied the End-product Approach 
and Overly Scrutinized the Originality Required for a 
Compilation as Described in Feist .............................................188 
 A. The Colorized, Shaded Maps Involve Aesthetic 
Choices Sufficient to Satisfy the Minimal Level of 
Creativity Required for a Compilation ..............................189 
 B. Regardless of Their Classification as a Compilation, 
the Maps Contain Pictorial Qualities That Display the 
Requisite Originality .................................................................193 
 IV. Courts Have Created a Disparity of Protection Between 
Photography and Other Graphic Works ..................................195 
 A. Applying the Front-end Approach as Seen in Ets-
Hokin, the Maps in Darden Would Qualify for 
Protection ...........................................................................195 
 1. A basic presumption of authorship and creativity 
strongly favors copyright protection ............................196 
 2. The cases do not consider the role of the author in 
the same manner, so the evidence and discussion 
of creative choice are dissimilar ...................................197 
 3. Courts equate simplicity with authorial restraint in 
photography, but with adoption of the 
conventional (and unoriginal) in graphic works ........199 
 B. As Seen in Other Graphic Works Cases, the Front-end 
Approach Highlights the Selection Process, Which Is 
Otherwise Neglected in the End-product Approach........200 
 V. The Front-end Approach Should Be the Standard 
Followed By the Copyright Office and Courts as the 
Method of Evaluating Originality in Visual Works ..................201 
 A. The Front-end Approach Is Appropriate for Visual 
Works Because Hindsight Plays a Lesser Role and the 
Scope of Protection Is Still Dictated by Originality ..........202 
 B. Courts and the Copyright Office Should Abandon 
Presumptions of Originality Because These 
Presumptions Ignore the Small Class of Works that 
May Lack Originality and Do Not Provide Adequate 
Notice of What Elements of a Work Are Copyrighted .....203 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2008] DISPARITY IN COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 171 
                                                          
INTRODUCTION 
Photography is a system of visual editing.  At bottom, it is a matter 
of surrounding with a frame a portion of one’s cone of vision, while 
standing in the right place at the right time.  Like chess, or writing, 
it is a matter of choosing from among given possibilities, but in the 
case of photography the number of possibilities is not finite but 
infinite. 
John Szarkowski1
 
The logic of Szarkowski’s quotation is largely the logic employed by 
courts when they evaluate the creativity necessary to warrant 
copyright protection for a photograph.  The word “graphic design”2 
could easily be substituted for “photography” in Szarkowski’s 
quotation because both fields involve composition, perspective, and 
coloring.  This interchangeability within the quotation might suggest 
that works of graphic design are protected in the same manner.  
Courts, however, are not employing the same logic for works of 
graphic design as for photography despite the similarities of the 
fields. 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”), a 
copyrightable compilation is a work created by collecting and 
assembling preexisting materials or data so as to create an original 
work of authorship.3  When reduced to elemental levels, the vast 
majority of, if not all, works are combinations of preexisting materials 
or based upon some prior expression.4  In evaluating whether a work 
enjoys copyright protection, however, courts do not analyze various 
visual fields in the same manner.  This creates a disparity of 
 1. Quoted in SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 192 (1978). 
 2. Throughout this Comment, the term “graphic design” encompasses the art 
or profession of visual communication that blends words, ideas, and images to relay 
information to a given audience, see THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/graphic design.  This Comment focuses upon graphic works, such as maps 
and layouts that involve arrangement and depiction of several elements. 
 3. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (noting selection, coordination, or arrangement as 
ways to distinguish the resulting work as a whole as original). 
 4. See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“In a colloquial sense, of course, a photograph is derived from the object that is its 
subject matter.”); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 
1993) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en banc) (“Nothing 
today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new:  Culture, like science 
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came 
before.”); cf. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 
(2003) (discussing the problem of requiring attribution to uncopyrighted materials 
because many works are built upon others, such as the film Carmen Jones, which is 
based upon the musical based upon an opera based upon a novel). 
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protection such that works comprised of essentially the same subject 
are protected only when presented in certain formats. 
Having different standards for different formats of visual works 
makes the originality determination, which is the basis for copyright 
protection, too convoluted in inappropriate and fuzzy distinctions.  
With advances in design and photography software, the lines between 
photography and graphic design are blurring.  Software now allows a 
user to add content or alter existing content in a photograph so that 
some of the finished products cannot be clearly considered 
photography.  Consider an artist taking a photograph of New York 
City’s Times Square.  If that same artist digitally removed the content 
of a billboard and replaced it with another ad that she designed, is 
the resulting image a photograph or graphic work?  What if she 
simply removed some trash and vehicles from the photograph?  
Attempting to segregate works as graphic design versus photography 
could become too technical and lead to arbitrary results because the 
disciplines often meld together.  Due to this melding, a single 
approach is necessary to keep the analysis from becoming 
unworkable and too focused on valuing aesthetic choices.  Otherwise, 
as this Comment demonstrates, the label (of photograph or graphic 
work) given to a work may prove determinative of originality and 
ultimately of copyrightability. 
Furthermore, such disparity allows for the inappropriate inference 
that one medium of expression is valued more than another despite 
the fact that courts generally shy away from assessments of artistic 
quality and value.5  For example, suppose a photographer, using a 
red backdrop, takes a photograph of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa 
in a studio.  The lighting of the photograph creates a long shadow, 
but overall the photograph is very basic.  Now suppose a graphic 
designer, using computer software to produce a promotional poster, 
inserts an image of the Mona Lisa onto a red background and adds 
some effects to create the illusion of similar shading and dimension.  
Assuming, as this Comment argues, that such a composition is 
original in the realm of copyright law, both works should merit 
copyright protection.  Simply granting protection to the 
photographer implies that the photographer’s work is superior to the 
graphic designer’s work. 
 5. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) 
(advising against judges evaluating the artistic merit of works); see also Christine 
Haight Farley, Judging Art, 70 TUL. L. REV. 805, 810–19 (2005) (recounting the 
various arguments against judges evaluating art while emphasizing protection of art, 
an undefined term, as valuable). 
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This Comment focuses upon works that are original despite 
utilizing subtle and conventional aesthetic techniques.  These works 
still deserve scrutiny by the U.S. Copyright Office (“Copyright 
Office”) and the courts.  With the growth of digital technology, the 
public at large can more easily acquire another person’s work and 
make changes to create a new work.  The issue of ascertaining the 
copyright in such works, therefore, extends beyond the world of 
professional designers.  If copyright is supposed to be a motivator for 
development and growth of ideas in the marketplace, authors need 
to know what aspects of their works are “theirs.”  If courts do not take 
the time to acknowledge the details and artistic choices within works, 
the public will be deterred from creating original works and might 
resort to copying.  Even when a work has minimal originality, 
copyright law protects that bit of originality such that overt copying is 
impermissible.6
This Comment argues that, despite common reliance upon the 
Supreme Court’s most recent guidance in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co.7 regarding originality, courts apply a 
different approach when evaluating the requisite creativity within 
works of graphic design.8  These different approaches result in a 
disparity of protection for graphic works in comparison to 
photographic works with similar compositions.9  Part I of this 
Comment discusses the basic framework of copyright, authorship and 
originality, and the historic jurisprudence on copyright protection of 
visual works.  Part II identifies and explains the emergence of two 
approaches for analyzing originality in visual works:  (1) a front-end, 
author-focused approach concentrated upon the pictorial aspects of 
the work, which is prevalent in photography cases; and (2) an end-
product approach commonly applied to graphic works and seemingly 
consistent with language in Feist.  This Comment focuses its analysis 
upon the errors of a map case, heard by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Forth Circuit, to demonstrate how the end-product 
approach is a problematic method for ascertaining originality.  
Looking first at the maps as a compilation, Part III argues that the 
Fourth Circuit erroneously upheld the application of the end-
product approach and that the Copyright Office overly scrutinized 
 6. See infra note 120 (discussing “thin authorship”). 
 7. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 8. See infra Part II (discussing the emergence of two approaches for analyzing 
the originality contained in visual works:  the front-end, author-focused approach 
and the end-product approach). 
 9. See infra Part IV (highlighting the disparity in treatment between maps and 
other works). 
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the maps and web pages at issue when the Office denied copyright 
registration.  Further, this part illustrates how the maps, in fact, 
satisfied the originality requirements of both a compilation and a 
pictorial work.  Part IV then analyzes the maps as pictorial works 
rather than compilations so as to demonstrate the disparity in 
treatment of maps from other visual works, specifically photography.  
This Part analyzes the maps of a Fourth Circuit case in relation to a 
Ninth Circuit photography case involving the same compositional 
elements.  Despite the comparable compositional elements, the two 
cases result in opposite holdings regarding the presence of 
originality.  To illustrate this disparity in protection, this Comment 
examines how the maps would likely merit copyright protection 
under the front-end approach.  Part V recommends the adoption of a 
streamlined front-end approach because that approach better 
comports with the goals of copyright law and moves away from the 
end-product approach which too closely resembles the tougher 
standard of novelty required in patent law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Subject Matter and Limitations on Copyright Protection 
The Constitution bestowed upon Congress the power to grant 
authors and inventors exclusive rights to their works for a limited 
period,10 despite being at odds with the First Amendment right of 
freedom of expression.11  Articulated objectives for copyright law vary 
from giving value to human authorship, to supplying new works for 
the greater benefit of society, to creating incentives for publishing.12
Generally, copyright protection extends to original works of 
authorship in a tangible form.13  Originality is often the determinative 
factor of a copyright, and the “author” is the entity who created the 
expression.14  Copyright protection, however, is limited to the 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (conditioning congressional power to grant 
limited monopolies upon the promotion of the sciences and arts). 
 11. Compare Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (proclaiming benefits to society as the primary 
objective of intellectual property rights, not rewards for the labors of authors), with 
U.S. CONST. amend. I (declaring Congress shall not make a law abridging freedom of 
speech). 
 12. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It’s an Original!(?):  In Pursuit of Copyright’s 
Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 189–90 (2005) (discussing how asking six 
different people about the goals of copyright law would likely result in six different, 
yet logical responses and outlining some of those goals). 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (stating a work may qualify for copyright 
protection so long as it is in a tangible medium). 
 14. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46 (defining “author” as the originator or maker). 
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expression in the work, not the underlying ideas or concepts.15  This 
limitation is often described as the idea-expression dichotomy.  For 
example, the facts in a news story are not copyrightable because the 
news agency is not the origin of the facts.16  The substantive 
information in such a news story is not protectable, but the particular 
formation of words expressing those facts, which has a literary quality, 
is protectable.17  Copyright case law has made a distinction between 
creation and discovery so that creations may warrant copyright 
protection while discoveries remain open for use as part of the public 
domain.18  Therefore, anyone may write about a destructive fire of a 
historical building, but each author has a copyright in her original 
expression, i.e., diction and sentence structure. 
As works and expressions begin to incorporate more elements and 
authors, the inquiry into copyright becomes more complicated.  The 
Copyright Act explicitly states that compilations are within the subject 
matter of copyright.19  The copyrights for these types of works, 
however, “extend[] only to the material contributed by the author of 
such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed 
in the work.”20  Therefore, an author can take non-copyrightable 
elements and copyright the arrangement, but the scope of the 
 15. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (establishing that copyright protection does not 
extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, 
principles, or discoveries); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) 
(explaining that the objective of sharing useful knowledge would be frustrated by 
considering further use of the knowledge as piracy); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 
810 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a sculptor cannot prevent others from copying 
elements in sculptures based upon physiology or the use of a particular medium).
 16. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) 
(emphasizing published information on current events is not the creation of the 
writer but “is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris”); cf. Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) (stressing an author may 
not copyright ideas or facts he narrates but may copyright an autobiography as a 
whole). 
 17. See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234 (pointing out the dual nature of news as 
(1) substantive information and (2) “the particular form or collocation of words in 
which the writer has communicated it” because copyright protection only extends to 
the latter).  For example, an Impressionist painter has a copyright in each of his 
original paintings but not for the Impressionist style of painting. 
 18. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (distinguishing between creation and discovery 
because a person who finds and reports a fact has simply discovered its existence and 
has not made that fact come into existence); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (articulating that a person who discovers a fact does 
not constitute its “maker” or “originator”); cf. Satava, 323 F.3d at 807 (exploring the 
goal of benefiting public and limiting what an artist may protect). 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (precluding protection for any part of the work used 
unlawfully). 
 20. Id. § 103(b). 
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copyright is limited to that arrangement because that is all that is 
original to that author.21
B. Originality Is the Touchstone of Copyright Law 
1. Originality is a very low threshold, requiring  only a small indication of 
 creativity 
Beyond being an expression in tangible form, a work must also be 
original to merit copyright protection.22  Nimmer on Copyright states 
that “[a]ny ‘distinguishable variation’ of a prior work will constitute 
sufficient originality to support a copyright if such variation is the 
product of the author’s independent efforts, and is more than merely 
trivial.”23
The Supreme Court articulated the requirement of originality most 
recently in Feist.24  There, the Court declared originality to be the 
touchstone of copyright protection.25  A telephone utility brought a 
copyright infringement suit against an area-wide telephone directory 
because the publisher printed the names and addresses of the utility’s 
customers without permission.26  Feist was a case in which two 
somewhat incongruent principles of copyright overlapped:  “The first 
is that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of 
facts generally are.”27  The Court discussed originality, in terms of 
creativity, as the key to resolving the tension between the two 
propositions.28  Despite a requirement of creativity, the threshold is 
 21. See, e.g., Satava, 323 F.3d at 810–11 (holding that the sculptor had copyright 
protection in the aspects of his jellyfish sculpture that went beyond the physiological 
nature of the species, such as the particular curl of a tentacle, but not in the accurate 
depiction of the species). 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists . . .in original works of 
authorship . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (2d ed. 2000) (noting the word originality was left 
undefined in the Copyright Act because the phrase “original works of authorship” 
was intended to be a standard established by the courts). 
 23. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.01[B]. 
 24. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(requiring (1) a work independently created by the author and (2) a slight amount 
of creativity). 
 25. Id. at 345–46 (declaring originality to be the “sine qua non of copyright”); cf. 
Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global:  A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in 
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 974 (2002) (“Feist established, 
arguably for the first time with this level of clarity, that creative choices were what 
gives a work its originality.”). 
 26. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 342–44 (resolving a suit over use of listings of data for 
which Rural had refused to grant Feist a license). 
 27. Id. at 344. 
 28. See id. at 345 (pronouncing that originality “means only that the work was 
independently created by the author” and requires a minimal level of creativity that 
most works easily meet by showing some creative spark). 
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very low.29  The Court explained that a compilation is not 
copyrightable per se but can be copyrightable based upon a tripartite 
structure:  (1) the collection of pre-existing material, (2) the 
selection and arrangement of those materials, and (3) the creation of 
an original work from that selection and arrangement.30  The 
originality is critical.31  The Court explained that § 101 of the 
Copyright Act means that some fact-based works will not be original 
in the copyright sense.32   
Before outlining the three elements of a copyrightable 
compilation, the Feist court rejected the “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine,33 which regarded copyright protection as a benefit for the 
effort expended in compiling facts.34  This doctrine rewarded 
copyright protection based upon the effort that went into a work 
rather than based upon its originality.35  The Court stated that the 
doctrine’s most glaring shortcoming was that it granted copyright 
protection for the facts included in a compilation, as well as the 
selection and arrangement of those facts.36  Furthermore, the Court 
emphasized that the objective of copyright is to promote the arts and 
sciences, not to reward the effort of authors.37
The Court found that the allegedly infringed white pages were not 
copyrightable because the alphabetical listing did not possess the tiny 
amount of creativity necessary.38  Further, the Feist court questioned 
any “selection” and “arrangement” involved in the white pages 
because the company printed the information of its customers as 
 29. See, e.g., Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 
(D.D.C. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing originality as requiring independent creation and “just a 
scintilla of creativity.”); see also text accompanying note 23 (characterizing a 
“distinguishable variation” as sufficient for finding originality in a work). 
 30. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 341 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 31. See id. at 358 (accentuating that the statute stipulates a principal focus on 
“whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to 
merit protection”). 
 32. See id. (acknowledging that the language of the statute makes clear that 
“[n]ot every selection, coordination, or arrangement will pass muster”). 
 33. See id. at 355–56 (recounting the measures Congress took to eliminate the use 
of the sweat of the brow in copyright law, such as stating that copyright protected 
only those “copyrightable component parts” within a work). 
 34. Id. at 352. 
 35. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 3.04[B][1] (outlining the history and rationale 
of the sweat of the brow doctrine); see also infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the wide 
application of the sweat of the brow doctrine within the field of cartography). 
 36. Feist, 499 U.S. at 353. 
 37. Id. at 349. 
 38. See id. at 362–63 (charging that Rural’s white pages simply list information 
customers are required to provide in order to receive a phone number and exhibit 
no selection because publication is mandated by law). 
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required by law and merely alphabetized the entries by name.39  The 
Court explicitly stated, however, that the requisite creativity is not 
novelty.40  Somewhat contrary to that declaration, the Court 
described the white-page listings as “entirely typical,” “garden-variety,” 
“so commonplace . . . to be expected as a matter of course,” and 
“practically inevitable.”41  Commentators have noted that the use of 
these terms suggests a novelty standard that the Court rejected 
elsewhere in its opinion.42
 39. See id. at 362–63 (stating that Rural was required to publish names and 
telephone numbers of its subscribers so that “one could plausibly conclude that this 
selection was dictated by state law, not by Rural” and that alphabetizing the names 
was an “age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition”). 
 40. See id. at 345–46 (elaborating on the principle that originality is not 
synonymous with novelty through the example that two poets unknowingly could 
compose identical poems which are both original and copyrightable).  Courts have 
repeatedly stated that originality is not the same as novelty.  See, e.g., id. at 345 
(stating explicitly that originality is not novelty); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 
967 F.2d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Originality does not require ‘novelty, ingenuity, 
or aesthetic merit.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664)).  Nimmer on Copyright states that: 
 [I]t is now clearly established, both as a matter of congressional intent and 
judicial construction, that the originality necessary to support a copyright 
merely calls for independent creation, not novelty. Thus, a work will not be 
denied copyright protection simply because it is substantially similar to a 
work previously produced by others, and hence, is not novel.
1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.01[A]. 
Under copyright law, two authors theoretically may create identical expressions 
and each author may copyright the expression.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (explaining 
that a work may still be original even if it is very similar to another work so long as 
the similarity is not the result of copying); see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.01[A] 
(theorizing that a work is original and may command copyright protection even if it 
is completely identical to a prior work).  But see Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 188 
n.11  (stating that a court, however, would likely still find infringement in a case of 
striking similarity between a copyrighted work and an allegedly infringing work if 
there was any reasonable possibility that the defendant might have encountered the 
plaintiff’s work at some time and citing a case in which the defendant 
“unconsciously” infringed).  Such duplication, however, is not permissible within 
patent law where the first creator alone generally may benefit from exclusive rights.  
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (prohibiting patentability if “the invention was known 
or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication 
in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant”). 
So long as an Author B does not copy Author A’s copyrighted expression, Author 
B’s expression should merit copyright protection irrespective of other similar work so 
long as it is original.  Compare id. (establishing the more burdensome patent 
requirement of being first to arrive at the concept or method), with 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2006) (simply stating a work may qualify for copyright protection so long as it is an 
original expression in a tangible medium). 
 41. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 363; see also id. at 362–63 (discounting presence of any 
selection and finding alphabetization of listings lacking creativity because of the 
long-standing use in organizing information). 
 42. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No Sweat?  Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 343–44 (1992) 
(arguing the terminology in Feist suggests the patent standard of protection but 
cautions that lower courts should not interpret a requirement of novelty or 
nonobviousness for finding a compilation to be original); Zimmerman, supra note 
12, at 208 (postulating that “the Court went two ways” as to whether or not originality 
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Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, did not clearly articulate 
whether a court should evaluate originality by looking at the work 
itself or by considering the author’s choices43 in making the resulting 
work.44  This lack of clarity proves problematic as courts have applied 
the novelty-like language of Feist to works beyond alphabetized 
telephone directories.45
2. Courts recognize that graphic works may  warrant copyright protection 
Courts have long acknowledged that works of graphic design may 
be original and, therefore, warrant copyright protection.  In 1903, the 
Supreme Court addressed the application of copyright protection to 
posters in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,46 which involved an 
alleged infringement of posters advertising a circus.47  The Court 
explicitly held that the Copyright Act does not purport to classify 
ordinary posters at a level beneath copyright protection48 and 
concluded that the commercial aspect of the poster did not bar 
copyright protection.49
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court in Bleistein, adopted a 
standard that if the expression is not copied, then that expression is 
original because “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
 
should be a measure of novelty because O’Connor first wrote that originality did not 
demand novelty but then explained the work’s lack of originality as the result of an 
“entirely typical” methodology). 
 43. Throughout this Comment, “author choices” will be construed in accordance 
with Professor Gervais’s definition of creative choices:  “[A] creative choice is one 
made by the author that is not dictated by the function of the work, the method or 
technique used, or by applicable standards.”  Gervais, supra note 25, at 976–77. 
 44. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 209 (acknowledging that Feist does not 
expound upon how originality is to be found (citing Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the 
Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 334–35 (1992))). 
 45. See, e.g., Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (part 
numbers to identify screw fasteners); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (toner loading software); Matthew 
Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (CD-ROM 
compilations of judicial opinions); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (video game). 
 46. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
 47. See id. (addressing whether reduction and reproductions of posters depicting 
ballet dancers and a family on bicycles could be copyrighted despite commercial 
nature). 
 48. See id. at 251 (finding appeal to public does not reduce value of posters so as 
to place such works outside the scope of the Copyright Act).  But see Ginsburg, supra 
note 42, at 340–41 (advocating recognition of two kinds of copyright protection—
one for high-authorship works such as novels and paintings and one for low-
authorship works such as maps and similar information compilations—because 
copyright in low authorship works rests in the labor but should still merit some 
protection after Feist without “disguising low authorship works as high authorship 
endeavors”). 
 49. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 (reasoning that works are not less connected with 
the fine arts just because they attract the public’s attention and are intended to help 
make money). 
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trained only in the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.”50  Holmes suggested that finding some of the author’s 
personality within the work is adequate for originality.51  Holmes’s 
view of originality reaches expansively because he reasoned that even 
“a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is 
one man’s alone,” thereby meriting copyright protection.52
Courts continued to find copyright protection for works of graphic 
design involving the arrangement of pictures, illustrations, color, and 
type.53  Bleistein’s limit upon a judge’s evaluation of the artistic merit 
in a work has remained prevalent.54  One commentator contends that 
Feist was a response to the very broad granting of copyright embodied 
in Holmes’s approach.55
Because this Comment analyzes the copyrightability of a map,56 it is 
important to discuss the distinctive history of maps in order to 
understand the complicated aspects of analyzing their 
copyrightability.  Despite the early approval of copyright protection 
for graphic works as seen in Bleistein, maps have a checkered past in 
copyright case law that is not typical of other graphic works.57  Early 
maps were of great value as the country expanded.58  This value, 
 50. Id.; see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.01[B] (discussing the Bleistein 
standard for the necessary quantum of originality as simply requiring the recognition 
of a distinguishable change from a prior work so long as the author made the change 
independently and the change is not trivial). 
 51. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (reasoning that personality contains something 
unique and demonstrates singularity). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Reader’s Digest Ass’n Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 
805–06 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding a magazine cover copyrightable due to the 
arrangement and layout of lines, typefaces, and colors); Roth Greeting Cards v. 
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding seven greeting 
cards, such as a card with a young child on the front and “i wuv you” on the inside, 
was copyrighted based upon the “text, arrangement of text, art work, and association 
between art work and text”). 
 54. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.01[B] (discussing Alfred Bell & Co. v. 
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), in which the court stated 
copyright protection basically just prevents actual copying of another work). 
 55. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 202 (arguing that Feist was the first step in 
correcting the cost to “the law’s moral and intellectual authority” lost by the 
adoption of Holmes’s broad and predictable approach to originality). 
 56. See discussion infra Part III. 
 57. See generally John F. Whicher, Originality, Cartography, and Copyright, 38 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 280 (1963) (tracing the jurisprudence of cartography in copyright law). 
 58. See David B. Wolf, Is There Any Copyright Protection for Maps After Feist?, 39 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 224, 228 (1992) (highlighting the important role of 
cartography during the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century as the United States 
grew in population and commerce led to a focus upon maps within a practical and 
scientific framework). 
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however, clouded courts’ views of the originality of maps.59  It is 
arguable that Feist’s rejection of the sweat of the brow doctrine60 
significantly impacted cartography.61  The rationale for the sweat of 
the brow doctrine was that “one should not freely reap the benefit of 
another’s industry in reporting and researching facts or other public 
domain material.”62  Courts used this doctrine extensively in map 
cases in order to find originality.63  This reliance on the sweat of the 
brow resulted from the traditional view that maps are compilations as 
defined in § 101 of the Copyright Act.64  Despite the dual nature of 
maps as factual compilations with original elements of selection and 
organization and also as graphic works, one commentator noted that 
most courts have resolved this duality “by demeaning the selective, 
organizational, and pictorial originality of cartography and by 
protecting the utilitarian and fact-gathering aspects.”65  Looking at 
maps from the pictorial perspective has largely been unused.66  As 
 59. See, e.g., id. (stressing that variations in maps were viewed as a way of 
camouflaging the appropriation of another’s factual material); cf. David B. Wolf, New 
Landscape in the Copyright Protection for Maps:  Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 40 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 401, 402 (1993) (“Each cartographer who does his job 
properly will reach the same result:  ‘certain common objects of information . . . 
must, if described correctly, be described in the same words.’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 60. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (articulating the Court’s 
reasoning for rejecting the use of the sweat of the brow doctrine as a means for 
copyright protection). 
 61. See Wolf, supra note 58, at 224 (postulating that Feist “dealt a death blow” to 
map case law and might mean maps have no copyright protection or greater 
protection for the pictorial elements).  See generally Robert A. Gorman, Copyright 
Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1571–76 
(1963) (outlining the early history of maps within copyright law). 
 62. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 3.04[B]; see supra note 35 and accompanying text 
(describing the sweat of the brow doctrine). 
 63. Wolf, supra note 58, at 228.  But see Gorman, supra note 61, at 1572–73 
(arguing that Amsterdam v. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951), 
mistakenly transformed the sweat of the brow doctrine into a test of originality, 
instead of infringement). 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing a list of definitions for terminology 
appearing in the statute); Wolf, supra note 58, at 226 (explaining that this distinction 
prevents protection of the utilitarian aspects and of pictorial features that are 
inseparable from the utilitarian aspects). 
 65. Wolf, supra note 58, at 227; accord Gorman, supra note 61, at 1575 (arguing 
that other utilitarian writings are copyrightable and that copyrights in such works do 
not prevent others from reaching the same results); 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 
3.04[B][2] (“Feist does not stand for the proposition that factual compilations are 
beyond copyright protection or even require more than the standard quantum of 
originality.”) (emphasis in original). 
Wolf further argues that courts have looked at maps as directories because (1) the 
subject matter was determinable in a “unitary and stable fashion” and (2) the value 
in the map was the objective reality presented.  Wolf, supra note 58, at 227.  See 
generally id. at 227–31 (outlining early cases viewing maps as compilations). 
 66. See Wolf, supra note 58, at 240–41 (acknowledging United States v. Hamilton, 
583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978), in which the Ninth Circuit drew upon Bleistein and 
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discussed later in this Comment, the aversion to contemplating a 
map as a graphic work has led to greater scrutiny of the 
copyrightability of cartography. 
3. The issue of authorship in conjunction with the camera has led courts to 
 a cursory review of originality in photography 
Like graphic works, photography has long been within the scope of 
copyright protection.  The seminal case in copyright protection for 
photography is Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,67 in which an 
alleged infringer claimed a portrait photograph of Oscar Wilde did 
not have copyright protection because the photograph did not have 
an author.68  As a long-standing predecessor to Feist, much of the 
language in Sarony focused on creative choices and has been used to 
articulate the requisite creativity across mediums.69  The tension in 
the case involved whether the camera discovered the captured image 
or the photographer created the image.70  The photographer, 
Napoleon Sarony, emphasized his arrangement of the scene and 
subject.71  The company argued the resulting work was simply an 
operation of the camera so that no one actually authored the work.72  
The Court distinguished the Wilde portrait from the ordinary 
production of photography, upon which the Court made no 
decision.73  After recounting the steps and efforts Sarony took in 
 
Sarony to recognize maps like other creative works, as one of the few cases noting the 
pictorial aspects of maps). 
 67. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 68. See id. at 54–56 (arguing that Sarony’s portrait simply reproduced the exact 
features of natural objects). 
 69. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 547 
(1985) (autobiography infringement case noting a nonfiction work can be original); 
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001) (quilt design infringement 
case highlighting that the photograph from Sarony was the result of mental 
conception); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., Inc., 768 
F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985) (map infringement case noting significance of the work 
may be accidental); see Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s 
Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 454–55 (2004) 
(recognizing that Burrow-Giles is commonly cited for the proposition that the author 
is the originator). 
 70. See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 56 (distinguishing the rights of authors as governed by 
copyright law from the rights of inventors governed by patent law); supra Part I.A 
(noting the distinction between creation and discovery within copyright law); see also 
Farley, supra note 69, at 395–402 (relating the shift from photography as serving 
solely as a record of nature into a form of artistic expression despite the heavy 
reliance upon the camera). 
 71. See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 55 (describing arrangement of the draperies and other 
accessories, selection of Wilde’s costume, direction in posing of Wilde, and lighting 
judgments). 
 72. See id. at 59 (emphasizing the work as a result of light, chemicals, and 
machinery). 
 73. See id. (allowing the possibility that some photographs might have no 
copyright protection but declining to address the issue further). 
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stylizing the composition, the Court found that Sarony “made” the 
Wilde portrait because the image was a “harmonious” and “graceful” 
picture of Sarony’s own mental conception.74  Thus, the Court found 
originality in the pre-shutter activities of the photographer and 
bypassed the difficulty presented by the camera.75  The Sarony 
decision has been extended with Bleistein’s concept of originality such 
that “no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the 
personal influence of the author.”76
Because the Sarony court did not establish a test for evaluating 
ordinary photographs, courts have struggled to evaluate less 
contrived works of photography that seek copyright protection.77  
Despite other potential methods of locating authorship in 
photography, courts continue to focus on the directorial role of the 
photographer in the resulting composition.78  A recent controversial 
case, Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.,79 has suggested that the 
directorial role of the photographer may not always be enough to 
merit copyright protection when a photographer is attempting to 
replicate the original subject matter as accurately as possible.80  The 
court in Bridgeman found no copyrightability in photographic 
transparencies of well-known museum artwork because the later 
transparencies portrayed “underlying works without any avoidable 
 74. Id. at 60. 
 75. See id. (repeating Sarony’s directorial role in posing Oscar Wilde in front of 
contrived backdrop); see also Farley, supra note 69, at 413 (identifying Sarony’s own 
account as weighty and dispositive in Court finding an authorial presence within the 
portrait photograph); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE:  THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, 
AND THE LAW 58 (1991) (discussing Sarony and the development of a “doubleness” in 
originality that included connotations of artistic creativity and “[of] the work’s point 
of origination, not the unique, soul-invested nature of the work itself”). 
 76. Wolf, supra note 58, at 233; see also id. (extrapolating the combination of 
Sarony and Bleistein in Learned Hand’s district court decision in Jewelers’ Circular 
Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).  Jewelers’ was a 
compilation case but characterized maps as comparable to the compilation at issue.  
Id. at 228 n.8.
 77. See Farley, supra note 69, at 438–40 (asserting that courts after Sarony 
“accepted unthinkingly” the presence of authorship in photography). 
 78. See, e.g., id. at 433–37 (suggesting authorship in photography can be found in 
the tasks of the cameraman, the post-shutter production, and the selection of a single 
frame from the multiple takes of a photo shoot). 
 79. 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d on reh’g, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999).
 80. See id. at 426 (finding that “Bridgeman’s images are substantially exact 
reproductions of public domain works, albeit in a different medium”); see also Farley, 
supra note 69, at 450 n.251 (quoting court transcripts in which Bridgeman’s attorney 
argued a “mind operation” as the basis for originality, while the court equated the 
photographs at issue as analogous to the output of a Xerox machine and further 
distinguished between a finding of originality in art photography and family 
snapshots). 
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addition, alteration or transformation.”81  Under this reasoning, some 
technical choices within photography do not result in an original 
work.82   
II. COURTS TAKE TWO APPROACHES IN ANALYZING  
THE ORIGINALITY OF VISUAL WORKS 
Having established the low threshold of originality, as well as the 
applicability of copyright protection in the fields of graphic works 
and photography, this Comment now argues that the assessment of 
originality in the two fields is inconsistent.  Two approaches within 
visual works may have developed because the Feist court did not offer 
guidance as to how to determine minimal creativity within a work83 
and because some works can naturally be characterized as pictorial.  
With the Supreme Court speaking in generalities in Feist84 and 
Bleistein,85 the lower courts have been left with little guidance, so the 
divergent approaches are not surprising.  As discussed below, this 
Comment identifies, names, and defines two approaches regarding 
originality assessments.  Some courts rely on the approach of Sarony, 
where the Court gave great weight to the artistic choices that the 
author made in arriving at his finished product86 (the “front-end 
approach”) while other courts adopted the approach used in Feist, 
where the court relies almost wholly upon the end-product for 
evidence of creativity87 (the “end-product approach”). 
 81. Bridgeman, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 426–27.  The district court reached this 
conclusion based upon the copyright laws of the United Kingdom, not the Copyright 
Act.  See id. at 426 (applying the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988’s standard 
of “original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works”).  The UK originality 
standard, however, closely mirrors the U.S. standard such that the reasoning remains 
applicable within the context of this Comment.  Compare id. (describing the UK 
requirements as:  (1) origination from an author; and (2) a lack of copying), with 
supra note 24 (recounting the Feist court’s statement of copyrightability as authorship 
and originality). 
 82. See Farley, supra note 69, at 451 (noting the court making a distinction 
between technical choices involving the operation of the camera and pre- or post-
shutter activity). 
 83. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting the open question of 
whether to find originality in the work itself or the mental choices involved in the 
production of the work). 
 84. See 499 U.S. 340, 362-64 (1991) (denying that alphabetization is original for 
an arrangement or selection without any guidance upon what kind of arrangement 
or selection is atypical enough to warrant a classification as original).   
 85. See GAINES, supra note 75, at 65 (pointing out that finding “something” in the 
work to be creative “doesn’t tell us what is to be found,” thereby providing “nothing 
specific to look for in the authorial product”); supra notes 46–52 and accompanying 
text (describing Holmes’s opinion as indicative of originality but lacking elaboration 
on what elements in the work suggested “personality”). 
 86. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 87. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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A. The Front-end Approach Predominates in Photography Cases 
Following the precedent in Sarony, courts continued to analyze 
photography based upon the pre-shutter choices of the 
photographer, as well as based upon the instant in which the 
photographer chose to click the camera’s shutter and create the 
exposure.88  In Pagano v. Charles Beseler Co.,89 the court analogized the 
composition choices of Sarony to the timing choices of the challenged 
cityscape photograph.90  The court reasoned that deciding when to 
take the photograph undoubtedly required originality.91
In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures,92 famed photographer Annie 
Leibovitz sued for copyright infringement of her photograph of a 
nude, pregnant Demi Moore based upon a movie poster for Naked 
Gun 33 1/3:  The Final Insult.93  To assess infringement, the Second 
Circuit had to determine what in Leibovitz’s photograph was original 
and therefore protectable under copyright law.94  The Circuit 
concluded that Leibovitz was “entitled to protection for such artistic 
elements as the particular lighting, the resulting skin tone of the 
subject, and the camera angle that she selected.”95  These elements 
are the manifestation of the artist’s choices in composition just as 
those identified in Sarony.96
A court’s attempt at locating creativity is basically a self-fulfilling 
prophecy because an author makes multitudes of choices, including 
choices of what not to include.97  Even when a photograph is very 
simplistic in its composition, courts often credit this simplicity as a 
deliberate choice and not as an absence of creativity.98  
 88. See generally Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Pagano v. Charles Beseler Co., 234 F. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
 89. 234 F. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
 90. See id. at 964 (crediting timing of exposure as capturing human figures in 
artistic, not simply lifelike, positions). 
 91. See id. (concluding that timing is critical in resulting light and shading within 
the pleasing background of buildings and trees). 
 92. 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 93. Id. at 115. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 116. 
 96. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (stating 
the following as indicators of originality:  the posing of Wilde; the selection and 
arrangement of costumes, draperies and other items; the presentment of “graceful 
outlines;” the lighting; and the inducement of the “desired expression”).  But see 
GAINES, supra note 75, at 82 (criticizing Sarony as giving Oscar Wilde’s originality in 
himself to the photographer because Wilde was the subject of the photograph). 
 97. See Farley, supra note 69, at 434 (observing that the person operating the 
camera always makes choices when taking a photograph). 
 98. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“The 
least pretentious picture has more originality in it than directories and the like, 
which may be copyrighted.”); Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 
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Acknowledging the choice of simplicity in photography results in a 
more holistic evaluation of the creator’s choices—choices of what to 
include and of what to omit.  The presence of what the creator 
chooses to include is observable in the finished product, but the 
creator’s choices of what to omit may only be appreciated in the 
creator’s account of how she reached the finished product. 
The recent case of Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.99 illustrates the 
retention of this approach among modern courts.  A photographer, 
Joshua Ets-Hokin, challenged the production of photographs by 
others that mimicked his studio work.100 Ets-Hokin produced three 
photographs for Skyy, a vodka producer, in which the signature blue 
bottle appeared slightly shadowed but the angling was a “straight on” 
perspective.101
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the subject matter of the 
photographs (the blue vodka bottle) was not copyrightable.102  
Proceeding from this conclusion, the court held Ets-Hokin’s 
photographs met the minimum requirement of creativity, 
referencing the volume of case law holding that photographs 
generally satisfy this requirement.103
B. The End-product Approach Predominates in Graphic Works Cases 
In cases involving graphic compilation works, however, courts tend 
to look at the end-product and search for indications of creativity 
therein, as done in Feist.104  Little, if any, mention is made of the 
choices of the author.  This shift toward emphasis upon the work 
instead of the author traces back to Bleistein where the Court 
discussed aspects of the circus posters but not the author.105  In a pre-
 
274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff’d, 281 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1922) (“[N]o photograph, 
however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author . . . .”). 
 99. 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 100. Id. at 1071–72. 
 101. Id. at 1071. 
 102. Id. at 1078, 1080–81 (reasoning that to constitute a “preexisting work” within 
the meaning of “derivative work” the underlying work must be copyrightable, which 
the bottle is not because its design is useful rather than aesthetic); accord 1 NIMMER, 
supra note 22, § 3.01 n.10 (arguing “preexisting works” in the definition of derivative 
works requires copyrightability whereas “preexisting materials” in the definition of 
compilations does not). 
 103. See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1073–76 (recounting photography as an artistic 
expression and highlighting landmark cases such as Sarony). 
 104. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 362–63 
(1991) (referencing only the alphabetical order when discussing Rural’s claim of 
originality in its coordination and arrangement of facts and pointing to the “creator” 
of the directory, Rural, as making no choices in the selection of information because 
of a government requirement). 
 105. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903) 
(reasoning that the depiction of life does not deprive a work of copyright protection 
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Feist case, the D.C. Circuit looked solely at the arrangement and 
layout of elements—which did not qualify for copyright protection 
themselves—within the cover of Reader’s Digest in order to determine 
that the arrangement created “a unique graphic design and layout” 
meriting copyright protection.106
In a graphic design case shortly after Feist, the plaintiff sued for 
infringement of his heart-shaped picture of the earth.107  The Court 
of Federal Claims found that the design was not copyrightable 
because it was an idea and that, even if the picture was an expression, 
it was still not copyrightable because the expression existed in the 
public domain.108  The court seemed to rely upon the Feist language 
indicative of novelty because it reasoned that the perspective used in 
both works has been used for so long that use of such a perspective 
exists in the public domain.109  Furthermore, the court offered no 
account of the plaintiff’s mental process in arriving at his copyrighted 
design and looked for originality only from the finished work within 
the context of other similar works, including the defendant’s.110
The recent case of Darden v. Peters111 illustrates the retention of this 
approach.  The Fourth Circuit upheld the Copyright Office’s 
determination that a graphic designer’s work did not contain the 
necessary modicum of creativity to warrant copyright registration.112  
Darden created a website and commissioned “a stylized map of the 
United States that serves as a link to a separate page displaying a 
detailed map of any state selected by the user.”113  Darden involved two 
works:  (1) a collection of maps and (2) web pages that included the 
maps and other elements.114  The designer started the work with a 
 
and comparing the posters to Velasquez and Whistler); accord Peter Jaszi, Toward a 
Theory of Copyright:  The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 482 
(contrasting Sarony, in which the author received great emphasis while the work 
received only slight mention, with Bleistein, which “adopted the opposite tactic by 
focusing primarily on the characteristics of the posters themselves” and referencing 
art of stature). 
 106. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 806 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 107. Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 368 (1992). 
 108. Id. at 372. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. (finding that the perspective used by the plaintiff was similar to that of 
others and concluding that there was a lack of similarity in the remaining 
copyrighted elements of the design with the alleged infringer, thus ending the 
infringement evaluation). 
 111. 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 112. See id. at 287–88 (rejecting registration of Darden’s maps and website as 
compilation works). 
 113. Id. at 280. 
 114. See id. (specifying that Darden’s copyright application, filed in May 2002, 
involved registration of his website “APPRAISERSdotCOM” and a separate 
application for “Maps for APPRAISERSdotCOM”). 
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Census map, which is in the public domain and therefore not 
copyrighted, colored the map, and added shading to create a three-
dimensional effect.115  The Copyright Office and courts did not find 
the requisite creativity in Darden’s claim of “the special combination 
of font and color selection; visual effects such as relief, shadowing, 
and shading; labeling; and call-outs.”116 Further, the formatting and 
design of the website was not copyrightable as a compilation.117
The Fourth Circuit pointed to the Office’s established regulations 
to evaluate if Darden’s map and website design fell outside of works 
meeting the minimal level of creativity for copyright protection.118  
The regulation proscribes copyright registration of “familiar symbols 
or designs [and] mere variations of typographic ornamentation, 
lettering or coloring” as well as “[w]orks consisting entirely of 
information that is common property containing no original 
authorship.”119
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT APPLIED THE END-PRODUCT APPROACH  
AND OVERLY SCRUTINIZED THE ORIGINALITY REQUIRED  
FOR A COMPILATION AS DESCRIBED IN FEIST 
Before addressing the disparity created by the two approaches in 
Part IV, this Comment highlights the oversights created by the end-
product approach in Darden to demonstrate the weaknesses of the 
approach.  The maps in Darden are concededly simplistic, but this 
simplicity means the maps should receive a “thin” copyright that 
would basically prevent direct copying of the maps.120  First, this 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 281. 
 117. See id. at 281–82 (recounting the Copyright Office’s denial when Darden 
sought reconsideration as a compilation after examiner suggested this 
characterization might warrant protection). 
 118. Id. at 287; see 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1992); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991) (professing the existence of a small 
group of works that lack creative spark or contain such trivial creativity that it is not 
worthy of acknowledgment). 
 119. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1.  These regulations embody the idea/expression dichotomy 
codified in the Copyright Act and prevent trivial changes to a work product from 
barring use of information that exists within the public domain.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 
349 (emphasizing that the principle of idea/expression or fact/expression 
dichotomy applies to all works of authorship); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (explaining that a copyright does not 
prevent subsequent users from copying the elements that are not original from a 
prior author’s work, such as those in the public domain); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 
805, 812 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Congress did not intend for artists to fence off private 
preserves from within the public domain . . . .”). 
 120. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright in Electronic Maps, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 395, 397 
(1995) (identifying works of low authorship as particularly vulnerable to 
misappropriation in the digital age because of the ease of straightforward, cheap 
copying).  See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:  Copyright 
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section argues that the Darden maps could have satisfied the 
requirements for protection as a compilation.  Then, this section 
concludes that, even if protection as a compilation is too forced, 
protection as a pictorial work clearly applies and, in fact, involves 
simpler analysis. 
A. The Colorized, Shaded Maps Involve Aesthetic Choices Sufficient  
to Satisfy the Minimal Level of Creativity Required for a Compilation 
Following the Feist analysis for originality in compilations, the works 
for which Darden sought copyright protection must satisfy the 
definition of compilation within the Copyright Act.121  First, Darden’s 
maps122 easily satisfy the most basic and straightforward 
requirement—that of collecting and assembling pre-existing 
materials—because the graphic artist started with a “base” of existing 
digital and non-copyrightable U.S. Census maps123 depicting the 
country, individual states, and counties.124  The artist collected a map 
of the United States, maps of individual states, and maps of counties 
within states to make his larger work.125  The artist also assembled the 
maps, though concededly on a very basic level, when he adjusted the 
Census map boundaries so that the maps could be reproduced.126 
Furthermore, the artist also assembled the map of the United States 
 
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (1990) (presenting the 
idea of low authorship works); David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic:  Copyright 
Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91 (2007) 
(analyzing courts’ application of Feist to fact-based works). 
 121. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 357 (observing that copyrightable compilations must 
include “(1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) 
the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, 
by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an ‘original’ 
work of authorship”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining terms within the 
Copyright Act). 
 122. The website and maps are viewable at http://www.appraisers.com. 
 123. The Census maps are non-copyrightable materials because U.S. government 
products cannot be copyrighted.  See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (denying copyright protection 
to U.S. government works). 
 124. Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing the web 
designer’s process of starting with a digital version of the map and then adding 
coloring and labeling); accord Wolf, supra note 58, at 228 (acknowledging that most 
commercially produced maps begin with a basic foundation in a noncopyrightable 
government map). 
 125. See Darden, 488 F.3d at 280 (describing how the web designer stylized maps to 
three levels of specificity and labeled the areas, including adding “callout labels”). 
 126. See id. at 281 (noting the submission upon reconsideration of the artist’s 
account of his work on the maps, in which he states “each map was altered to such a 
degree that each line on each map is measurably changed from the digital 
originals”).  The artist also said that he resized and redrew many lines to prevent a 
“chunky” look.  Id.  Darden’s reply brief characterized these changes as “soften[ing] 
the maps’ appearance.”  Reply Brief of Appellant at 14, Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 
277 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1177). 
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by placing Alaska and Hawaii in their non-geographically 
representative locations to better utilize space.127
The Darden maps also satisfy the second prong through the 
selection of the materials.128  The Darden graphic artist “selected” the 
maps for the functional purpose of organizing listings for appraisers 
across the nation, but he also made some artistic and aesthetic 
alterations.129  It is true that, because the task was to create clickable 
icons of the U.S. states, the overarching subject matter of the work 
was selected for the designer, not by the designer,130 much as the 
content of the white pages in Feist was selected by state law.131  
Selection, however, is a term that extends more broadly than the 
selection of the subject matter, i.e. the facts one includes in the 
compilation.  In Darden, the designer may not have selected the 
subject matter, but he did select the particular map for his starting 
point from a plethora of government maps.132  The Darden graphic 
artist also had a wide array of colors available to him, and he used a 
particular blue color.133
Additionally, the second prong could also be satisfied by 
“arrangement” or “coordination,” in addition to “selection.”  To 
arrange is “to put in the correct, proper, or suitable order.”134  Again, 
the work is concededly simplistic, but this fact alone is not a bar to 
copyright protection as the designer arranged the states in their 
 127. See supra note 122 (displaying Darden’s maps).  In his filings to the Fourth 
Circuit, Darden emphasized that “[t]he map of Alaska shows creative use of the 
numerous elements in combination with nothing dictating placement other than 
creating balance and symmetry within the image.”  Reply Brief of Appellant at 14, 
Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1177). 
 128. See supra note 121 (outlining the three requirements for protection of a 
compilation). 
 129. See Darden, 488 F.3d at 280 (describing the website as allowing a user to click 
on the appropriate map and obtain a map with greater detail and listings for 
appraisers in a given county). 
 130. See id. (explaining that Darden commissioned the creation of the maps at 
issue for his online referral service to real estate appraisers throughout the United 
States). 
 131. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) 
(discounting any selection in the company’s publishing of names and corresponding 
telephone numbers in the directory because Rural was mandated to do this by the 
Kansas Corporation Commission). 
 132. To see the diversity of government maps available for use by the public, go to 
http://www.usa.gov.  Then click “Reference and General Government” and then 
“Maps.” 
 133. See BOB GORDON & MAGGIE GORDON, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO DIGITAL 
GRAPHIC DESIGN 188 (2002) (explaining that when designing in the digital setting, a 
designer has 6.7 million colors at her disposal, based upon the use of the three 
primary colors and 256 intensity levels). 
 134. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 76 (Victoria Neufeldt ed., 
MacMillan 3d ed. 1997). 
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geographic order.135  The designer’s arrangement is most evident in 
the country map because he positioned the outline of Alaska below 
Arizona and New Mexico and that of Hawaii in the nook between 
Texas and Florida.136  Also, based upon statutory construction, the 
term “coordination”137 has a meaning distinct from “arrangement.”  
Based upon the attention the designer paid to the outline of certain 
states when adding shading, one could argue some pairing or 
coordination of the elements occurred.138
Having established the first two prongs, which are essentially 
definitional of a compilation, the critical factor determining 
copyright protection remains.  To satisfy the final prong, the 
particular selection or arrangement must be original.139  Adding color 
and shading are far from novel concepts, but they still involve 
deliberate, aesthetic choices by the creator.140  The record in Darden 
indicates a deliberate choice because the graphic designer shadowed 
each map differently so as “to highlight the unique shape and 
attribute of each particular state or set of counties.”141
In its denial of copyright protection for the maps, the Copyright 
Office implicitly seemed to equate originality with novelty, despite 
courts’ traditional rejection of novelty as a requirement for copyright 
protection.142  Some of the descriptions of the telephone listings used 
by the Court in Feist seem applicable, but lead to a misguided 
 135. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 359 (theorizing instances in which the creative spark 
is “so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent” and therefore does not warrant copyright 
protection). 
 136. See supra note 122 (listing the online website where the maps are viewable). 
 137. To coordinate is to “to bring into proper order or relation” or “adjust 
(various parts) so as to have harmonious action.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 306 (Victoria Neufeldt ed., MacMillan 3d ed. 1997). 
 138. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 24, Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 
2007) (No. 06-1177) (specifying that the designer outlined the southern and western 
portions of Alaska to enhance the peninsulas and Aleutian Islands but highlighted 
the northwest and southwest corners of California). 
 139. See supra note 121 (describing the elements of a copyrightable compilation 
and emphasizing originality). 
 140. See RONNIE LIPTON, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INFORMATION DESIGN 158–59 
(2007) (advising designers to plan a project in black and white and then add color 
only as needed to convey the message, thereby using color clearly while abiding by 
the “don’t decorate” rule); cf. Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d. 739, 
748 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining to examine the maps feature-by-feature with the 
individual color choices as protected elements, and instead focusing on the overall 
manner of selection, coordination, and arrangement). 
 141. Brief of Appellant at 24, Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 
06-1177); see also supra note 138 (discussing the outlining and shading used to 
highlight portions of Alaska and California). 
 142. See Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that 
additions to preexisting maps such as color and shading lack the minimum creativity 
necessary for copyright protection, and not discussing the graphic artist’s choices of 
arrangement and shading). 
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evaluation of the required level of creativity.143  The Fourth Circuit 
would be incorrect to go so far as to conclude as the Supreme Court 
did in Feist that the arrangement was “so mechanical or routine as to 
require no creativity whatsoever.”144  Feist’s “routine” organization of 
the material consisted of alphabetization, whereas in Darden the 
arrangement of the maps—specifically their colorization and 
shading—did not have the functional role of organizing the 
material.145  The Darden graphic artist had a wide array of colors 
available to him, and he made an aesthetic choice of a particular 
shade of blue.146  Though adding color is a basic alteration often used 
to make elements more visually inviting, the use of blue is not 
“inevitable.”147  A work can replicate an expression and still be 
original; thus, evaluating the creativity of a work in terms of 
predictability would be misguided.148
Beyond color choice, the additions of shading and relief effects are 
typical techniques within the fine and commercial arts for adding 
dimension to an element in a two-dimensional work.149  The addition 
of dimension is prevalent within art and design, but creativity within 
copyright law is not about what concepts are present, but how they are 
presented.150  The “how” is the expression that is protected, and, 
here, the graphic artist had a number of techniques available for 
 143. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–63 
(1991) (characterizing the alphabetization of names as commonplace and typical). 
 144. Id. at 362. 
 145. Compare id. at 362–63 (finding that the phonebook’s arrangement was 
designed to help users navigate easily through many pages of names, but that the 
company displayed too little creativity in selecting the content), with Darden, 488 F.3d 
at 287 (ignoring the creator’s overall arrangement and perspective as well as 
discounting any aesthetic role played by the color change and the addition of 
shading performed by the creator). 
 146. See KAREN TRIEDMAN & CHERYL DANGEL CULLEN, COLOR GRAPHICS:  THE POWER 
OF COLOR IN GRAPHIC DESIGN 11 (2002) (suggesting that a consumer might feel trust 
toward a bank that uses blue in its logo and promotional materials because “sound 
financial institutions often rely on blue to communicate stability and trust”).  Color 
selections are often made because of the subject matter of the work and because of 
the audience.  See id. at 55 (listing twenty-one dominant colors with responses they 
generally elicit, such as gold evoking warmth and opulence). 
 147. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (observing that simply because two works are similar, 
such as having similar color schemes, does not eliminate each work’s originality nor 
prevent copyright protection).  See generally MARIO GARCIA, PURE DESIGN 138 (2002) 
(indicating that the purpose of color use in publications is “to energize the canvas, to 
attract the eye, . . .  and ultimately, to leave an impression”). 
 148. See supra note 28 (articulating the Feist requirements for originality). 
 149. In painting and design, a relief effect is the “apparent solidity or projection 
of objects, obtained by modeling and gradation of color.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1133 (Victoria Neufeldt ed., MacMillan 3d ed. 1997). 
 150. See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that 
the arrangement of certain colors and the styling of particular elements of a 
sculpture are copyrightable, but noting that the simple presence of such colors and 
elements is not). 
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adding a three-dimensional effect but chose one particular 
technique.151  The shading in Darden and alphabetization in Feist are 
similar as both arrangement techniques are conventional.  Shading, 
however, involves creativity because the technique includes 
additional, particular choices, such as the depth of the shading, the 
degree of shading gradient applied, and angling of the shadow, that 
extend beyond the mechanical nature of alphabetization.  The 
various choices regarding shading can lead to different outcomes 
whereas alphabetization produces one result.152
The maps likely constitute a thin copyright because the work’s 
originality is quite limited, but that originality does merit a copyright.  
Such a copyright would, and should, essentially prevent exact 
appropriation of Darden’s maps.153
B. Regardless of Their Classification as a Compilation, the Maps Contain 
Pictorial Qualities That Display the Requisite Originality 
Even if protecting Darden’s maps as a compilation is a bit 
contrived, the Bleistein analysis of the pictorial nature of a work is still 
relevant to Feist’s strong focus on creativity.154  The maps Darden 
sought to protect had economic value because they enhanced the 
appearance and accessibility of his website, and they also elicited the 
interest of others in licensing the use of the maps.155  Darden made a 
 151. See id. at 811–12 (suggesting that the curling of the jellyfish tentacles 
exemplified some level of artistic expression because the curling had aesthetic 
aspects not governed by the physiological nature of the jellyfish or the glass-in-glass 
medium). 
 152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (recounting the use of shading to 
highlight certain aspects of the maps); supra note 141 (demonstrating the choice of 
angling within the technique of shading). 
 153. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(explaining that, based upon the limited scope of the copyright in a factual 
compilation, a later compiler may use the facts from another author’s publication in 
preparing a latter work as long as latter work does not contain the same selection 
and arrangement). 
 154. Compare Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) 
(describing depiction as the creator’s reaction to the subject matter and as 
encompassing the creator’s personality through particular collections, designs, and 
internal combinations), with Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (articulating a more clinical 
approach to authorship as derived from independent creation and the slightest 
amount of creativity). 
 155. See Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing the ability 
of users to click on maps and find listings of appraisers in a given area). 
The underlying economic motive—subconsciously or not—often diminishes the 
artistic aspects, clouding the interpretation of the creator’s decision-making.  See 
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 (pronouncing that the use of a work to increase trade or 
make money does not weaken the work’s connection to the fine arts).  Bleistein itself 
evidences an unsuccessful attempt to deny copyright protection based on an 
undervaluation of commercially successful works.  See id. at 252 (denying that the 
commercial value or popular appeal of a work diminishes its aesthetic and 
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misguided attempt of using commercial viability as evidence of 
creativity despite Bleistein’s explicit finding that consumer and 
popular appeal do not factor into the determination of a work’s 
creativity.156
Ignoring the confusion of the commercial viability argument, 
Darden’s maps would likely warrant copyright protection had the 
Copyright Office and Fourth Circuit analyzed them as pictorial works 
within the Bleistein framework.157  Maps are modified illustrations of 
the political boundaries of states and counties.158  Despite the Fourth 
Circuit’s classification of them as trivial, the color choices and 
shading in Darden’s maps are evidence of artistic choices.159
Much like photography in the analysis discussed below,160 the 
Darden maps warrant copyright protection under the Bleistein’s 
circular argument.  In Bleistein, the Court made an initial 
determination that the overall work was pictorial or aesthetic, thereby 
indicating the presence of some creative choice or imprint of the 
author, because the Court generalized that pictorial works contain 
creativity.161  The maps, using the language of Bleistein, are an 
“ensemble,” including all the details and “particular combinations of 
figures, lines, and colors” in which the choices of the artist bear 
greater attention and emphasis.162  Describing the elements of the 
work as “particular” acknowledges the deliberation and mental 
 
educational value).  Courts are rightly leery of defining what art is and what 
constitutes good art because such determinations delve into purely subjective 
discussions of aesthetics.  See id. at 251–52 (hypothesizing that permitting judges 
trained only in the law to assess the worth of pictorial illustrations would leave certain 
works outside the scope of protection); cf. Farley, supra note 5, at 809 (advocating 
that courts ought not adopt a single aesthetic theory of art but that they acknowledge 
various, and even conflicting, theories so that observers are clear on the approach 
taken by a given court). 
 156. See Darden, 488 F.3d at 287 (remarking that other real estate companies 
associated the maps with Darden and made offers to license their use). 
 157. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (setting out the broad standard for originality in 
that a work with “[p]ersonality always contains something unique”). 
 158. See id. at 251 (defining pictorial illustrations as “prints or labels designed to 
be used for any other articles of manufacture”). 
 159. See id. at 250 (suggesting that handwriting is a “very modest grade of art,” yet 
it still bears the personality of the writer). 
 160. See discussion infra Part IV (considering the copyrightability of the Darden 
maps in the context of a comparable photograph). 
 161. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250–51 (providing no direct indicators of originality 
in the work but speaking only in generalizations); see also GAINES, supra note 75, at 69 
(contending that, because a photographer must express herself through a 
mechanical apparatus, the expression of personality must overcome the impersonal 
machine of the camera through the photographer’s choices, techniques and artistic 
practices). 
 162. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).  But see 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) 
(2007) (classifying “mere variations” in color and labeling as not subject to copyright 
protection). 
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choice of an artist that almost always illuminates the slightest glimmer 
of a creative spark.163  This approach focuses upon what is 
copyrightable rather than what is not.164
IV. COURTS HAVE CREATED A DISPARITY OF PROTECTION  
BETWEEN PHOTOGRAPHY AND OTHER GRAPHIC WORKS 
In Darden, the maps likely merited copyright protection as either 
compilation works or pictorial works.  The shortcomings of the 
Copyright Office’s and courts’ analysis of Darden’s maps discussed 
above are further exacerbated because similar deficiencies are not 
present in the front-end approach.  By contrasting the two 
approaches, this section illustrates the disparity they create when 
applied to different fields of visual works. 
A. Applying the Front-end Approach as Seen in Ets-Hokin, the Maps  
in Darden Would Qualify for Protection 
This section utilizes the facts of Darden165 and of Ets-Hokin166 to 
analyze the copyright treatment of photography and graphic design.  
It illustrates how the earlier example of a photograph and a 
promotional poster depicting the Mona Lisa167 do not earn the 
copyright protection that logic would suggest.  This Comment argues 
that copyright law should treat the Mona Lisa works the same, but the 
following analysis of Darden and Ets-Hokin reveals no such 
consistency.168
 163. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (proclaiming no doubt as to the original nature 
of work made by plaintiff’s designer). 
 164. Compare id. (looking at the choices made as indications of artistic 
personality), with 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (highlighting five categories of contributions 
that do not satisfy creativity requirement). 
 165. See supra notes 111–119 and accompanying text (outlining the facts and issues 
of Darden). 
 166. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (introducing the subject 
matter of the photograph in Ets-Hokin). 
 167. See discussion supra Introduction (introducing a hypothetical  photograph 
and promotional poster portraying the Mona Lisa). 
 168. Both Darden and Ets-Hokin addressed the copyrightability of works, but they 
did so in different contexts.  The Fourth Circuit reviewed the copyrightability of the 
maps based upon a challenge to the Copyright Office’s denial of copyright 
registration under the abuse of discretion standard.  Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 
280 (4th Cir. 2007).  The Ninth Circuit, however, approached the copyrightability of 
studio photography in the context of an infringement claim.  Ets-Hokin v. Skyy 
Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000).  In this context, “[w]hether a 
particular photograph is protected by copyright law is . . . subject to de novo review.”  
Id. at 1073.  Although the Darden standard defers to the Copyright Office’s 
determination, this Comment will argue that the Fourth Circuit’s analysis and 
conclusion were lacking.  An analysis of the appropriateness of the differing 
standards of review is outside the scope of this Comment. 
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The compositional nature of the maps and website in Darden is 
analogous to the studio photography in Ets-Hokin where the 
photographer positioned and manipulated the elements and lighting 
in a controlled setting.169  Ets-Hokin’s photographs were basically 
compositions of (1) noncopyrighted elements (the bottle and an 
additional glass in one frame), (2) color (the backdrop), and  
(3) some shading (lighting).170  The components in the Darden maps 
are the same:  (1) noncopyrighted elements (Census maps), (2) color 
(blue added to the maps), and (3) shading (relief and shading 
effects).171  Thus, the maps in Darden are equally deserving of 
copyright protection as the photograph in Ets-Hokin. 
1. A basic presumption of authorship and creativity strongly favors copyright 
 protection 
The discrepancy in outcomes seems to lie largely in the basic 
rubber-stamping of photographs as copyrightable subject matter.172  
Ets-Hokin references the volume of case law holding that photographs 
generally satisfy this requirement.173  The blanket assumption that a 
photograph warrants copyright protection derives from the idea of 
the photographer working as the “composer” of the produced image, 
separate from the mechanization of the camera.174  The graphic artist 
also “composes” through angles, lighting, and content in a given 
space.  Such considerations are typical of those working within the 
visual arts because they embody basic principles of composition, 
 169. Compare Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54–55 (1884) 
(observing that the photograph in question not only depicts its subject, but also 
creates a visible form by portraying draperies and accessories), and Ets-Hokin, 225 
F.3d at 1077 (enumerating the factors over which a photographer has control, 
including lighting, shading, angle, and background), with Darden, 488 F.3d at 280 
(constructing the background and positioning of the various map series within the 
website platform). 
 170. See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1071 (describing the photographs containing a 
bottle positioned in front of a plain white or yellow backdrop with back lighting). 
 171. See Darden, 488 F.3d at 281 (combining basic non-copyrightable elements into 
a compilation). 
 172. See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076–77 (reciting Judge Learned Hand’s comment 
that “no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of 
the author[,]” which is the view adopted by the Ninth Circuit (quoting Jewelers’ 
Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)). 
 173. See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1073–76 (touting photography as an artistic 
expression and surveying the historical photography cases such as Sarony). 
 174. See, e.g., Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60 (expounding upon the photographer’s 
contributions to the work by “selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and 
other various accessories,” and by arranging the subject (Wilde) and lighting).  See 
generally Farley, supra note 69, at 412–19 (analyzing courts’ interpretation of the role 
of the photographer in creating original works before and after the camera’s shutter 
exposure). 
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proportion, and color.175  For example, basic compositional 
principles, such as the rule of thirds,176 strongly influence the 
ultimate composition in both photography and design.177  As 
discussed later, this presumption often creates pitfalls in copyright 
protection and is likely inappropriate.178  The presumption, however, 
does exist within photography179 and contributes to the disparity in 
protection as compared to graphic works. 
2. The cases do not consider the role of the author in the same manner,  so the 
 evidence and discussion of creative choice are dissimilar 
Ets-Hokin and other photography case law often focus upon the 
actions of the creator, perpetuating an easier assessment and 
discovery of authorial input.180  The reliance upon the actions of the 
graphic artist before clicking the proverbial “publish” button would 
make originality as commonplace in graphic design as in 
photography.181  A graphic artist’s narrative of creation would 
verbalize the subtle and overlooked choices that a graphic artist often 
makes.182  Rarely would the first color choice of an artist remain 
unchanged or unaltered through the completion of the project.  Just 
 175. See ALFRED A. BLAKER, PHOTOGRAPHY:  ART AND TECHNIQUE 393–411 (1980) 
(reinforcing the importance of considering composition, including the golden 
mean, rule of strategic placement, and lines of movement, before taking a 
photograph); LIPTON, supra note 140, at 15–35 (describing the Gestalt principles, 
contrast, and golden mean). 
 176. According to early architects, the most pleasing form follows a ratio of 
roughly 2:3 known as the golden mean or golden proportion.  LIPTON, supra note 
140, at 22.  The rule of thirds, based upon the 2:3 proportion, divides a space into 
nine equal rectangles such that the intersections of the lines are the aesthetically 
pleasing positions for the focal point.  Id. at 23. 
 177. See GARCIA, supra note 147, at 138 (summarizing the three important 
characteristics of color:  (1) movement, (2) temperature, and (3) symbolism); 
LIPTON, supra note 140, at 22–23 (providing an overview of proportion and balance). 
 178. See discussion infra Part V.B (recommending courts abandon a presumption 
of originality within photography and not extend a similar presumption within 
graphic works). 
 179. See supra note 77. 
 180. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) 
(focusing on the photographer’s pre-shutter exposure activities in posing the 
subject); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, 137 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(elaborating on the detail that a photographer paid to evoking Botticelli’s Birth of 
Venus through the subject’s posture and hands); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 
(2d Cir. 1992) (articulating a photographer’s deliberate choice to include the 
owners in a puppy photo and the selection of the location for the shoot); Pagano v. 
Charles Beseler Co., 234 F. 963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (emphasizing a photographer’s 
choice of timing and its role in creating the subsequent photograph). 
 181. See Farley, supra note 69, at 390–91 (rationalizing the focus on the pre-shutter 
activities of the photographer as a way to distinguish expressive works from 
documentary or evidentiary works within the same medium). 
 182. See, e.g., LIPTON, supra note 140, at 25 (elucidating how a matching menu bar 
and logo in the same location on every page of a website creates an implied 
connection that embodies the Gestalt principle of closure and good continuation). 
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as a photographer may choose to change the angle of the camera so 
as to shift the focal point of the image from the perfect center of the 
photo, a graphic designer may choose to position the dominant 
element off-center.183  Presenting the creator’s narrative of the 
aesthetic evaluations allows courts to easily hone in upon these types 
of choices and thereby recognize elements that are original.184
Even in the posed, studio setting, the coloring changes and 
perspective suggest deliberate mood considerations of the creator, 
thereby favoring an authorial presence.185  For example, in Ets-Hokin 
the lighting of the photograph sets the tone or mood of the 
photograph because it impacts the brightness and shading of the 
colors within the frame.  Similarly, in Darden, the use of blue creates 
an overall feel for the work, such as a calming tone, that interacts 
with the type and other elements.  Though not normally articulated 
by courts, the graphic artist has great leeway to decide from what 
direction he wishes to add the shading and subsequent hints of three-
dimensional perspective. 
Some commentators, including Professor Dennis S. Karjala, argue 
that following an approach with heavy emphasis upon the mental 
process of the author will lead to overprotection.186  Karjala’s “sweat 
of the brain” theory overlaps with this Comment’s front-end 
approach.187  Karjala argues that this approach is contrary to the 
requirement that “expressive creativity in the end product 
independent of the manner or methodology by which the product 
was created” moves into the realm of protecting ideas.188  This view 
proves problematic in visual compilations.  Some expressions are the 
 183. See supra note 176 (describing the rule of thirds which would place the focal 
point away from the true center of the work). 
 184. See, e.g., Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60 (quoting from the photographer’s account of 
creating challenged photograph during explanation of authorial presence); Rogers, 
960 F.2d at 307 (listing the following as factors for assessing originality in 
photography:  posing, lighting, angle, and selection of film and camera selection, as 
well as “almost any other variant”). 
 185. See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304 (referencing photographer’s choice of 
lighting and manipulation of natural light in account of production of contested 
photograph); Pagano, 234 F. at 964 (making note of the pleasant feel created by the 
lighting and shading in the background of the photograph). 
 186. See Karjala, supra note 120, at 402 (arguing if intellectual judgment involving 
in determining information makes it “non-factual,” then very little will not receive 
copyright protection). 
 187. See generally id. at 400–04 (classifying “a finding of intellectual creative activity 
in the process of creating the work to conclude that the work was protected, even 
where there was no evidence of creativity in the final product except in the accuracy 
of its avowedly factual content” as the sweat of the brain theory). 
 188. Id. at 402. 
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result of choices not to include certain elements or aspects.189  These 
negative choices may not manifest themselves to a viewer without 
some narrative from the creator.  In evaluating a compilation work 
under Feist’s tripartite structure, selection is a key component.190  It 
seems illogical to argue that a court can fully assess selection within 
the four corners of a work when the work only represents the 
affirmative choices of the creator.191  Selection involves discerning 
among options, but the end-product does not always reflect the 
sphere the creator was working within to create that result. 
3. Courts equate simplicity with authorial restraint in photography, but with 
 adoption of the conventional (and unoriginal) in graphic works 
The commonplace, straight-on perspective does not deter 
copyright protection within photography because simplicity and 
predictability are praised in photography rather than scolded as 
“mere variations.”192  The simplicity of the maps and website in Darden 
might convey creative choice and restraint under the front-end 
approach, whereas it negates originality under the end-product 
approach.193  Simplicity in graphic works allows for the “message” to 
be louder and clearer,194 but this concept has been embraced for 
photographic works and not graphic works.195
 189. See LIPTON, supra note 140, at 218 (cautioning against including too much 
information in a design and advocating selectivity when creating an informational 
design). 
 190. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (including selection, 
arrangement, and coordination in two of the three elements for a copyrightable 
compilation). 
 191. See GAINES, supra note 75, at 69 (highlighting that finding personality within a 
photograph requires more than looking at the actual work and should include 
acknowledgement of choice, technique, and artistic practice). 
 192. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) 
(remarking the least pretentious picture has more originality than works like 
directories, which can be copyrighted); accord Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 
1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging straight-on, centered perspective of 
product shot likely resembled other shots of bottles, but arguing such similarity does 
not diminish the originality of the photographer’s work). 
 193. Compare Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (concluding the “least pretentious picture” 
involves more creativity than directories, which can have copyright protection), with 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (classifying 
alphabetical white pages as “an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition”). 
 194. See supra note 189 (instructing a designer to use selectivity in order to 
generate an effective product for the end user). 
 195. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing the acceptance of the 
front-end approach for photography). 
  
200 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:169 
                                                          
B. As Seen in Other Graphic Works Cases, the Front-end Approach 
Highlights the Selection Process, Which Is Otherwise Neglected 
 in the End-product Approach 
The end-product approach is not a new method of accessing 
creativity that began after Feist.  Rather, the technical end-product 
approach has been used in cases involving graphic works other than 
maps.  Without judicial or statutory guidance on evaluating 
originality, the approach will likely continue within the field due to 
this case law.  Looking at pre-Feist cases that describe the creativity 
based upon the end-product, many potential indicators of originality 
are not presented in the opinions, thereby perpetuating the technical 
approach of the end-product evaluation. 
In Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Conservative Digest Ass’n,196 the D.C. Circuit 
held that the district court was correct in concluding that the design 
of the Reader’s Digest magazine cover qualified for copyright 
protection.197  Despite acknowledging that the independent elements 
of the cover did not qualify for protection, the court found the 
“distinctive arrangement and layout of those elements [to be] 
entitled to protection as a graphic work.”198  The graphic design in 
this case warranted copyright protection under the end-product 
approach but indicates some of the shortcomings of the approach 
that cause other graphic works, like maps as discussed above, to be 
denied copyright protection. 
The vague language of Reader’s Digest hints at creativity in the 
arrangement but neglects aspects that might be noted in the front-
end approach.  The cover at issue in Reader’s Digest was primarily text.  
Typefaces themselves are generally regarded as not copyrightable.199  
The selection of the particular typeface, however, might be an 
indicator of creativity.200  Also, the repetition of text may create a 
graphic, cohesive effect that could indicate creativity because the use 
of type extends beyond its traditional purpose of forming words. 
In Meade v. United States,201 discussed earlier as an example of the 
end-product approach,202 the Court of Federal Claims court 
 196. 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 197. Id. at 806. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.15 (explaining that a House Committee 
statement seems to foreclose copyright protection for typeface but highlighting 
arguments that there in fact is not an absolute exclusion). 
 200. See LIPTON, supra note 140, at 100 (“Designers who love typefaces and 
appreciate their subtle differences, or ‘personalities,’ tend to spend a lot of effort on 
choosing typefaces.”).  Just like lighting and perspective (the angle of viewing the 
content), the typeface contributes to setting the tone of the work.  Id. 
 201. 27 Fed. Cl. 367 (1992). 
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concluded that the common aspects of the two works were 
unprotectable subject matter and, therefore, found no 
infringement.203  The court correctly concluded that a heart-shaped 
picture of the earth is an idea and therefore not copyrightable.204  
However, the court incorrectly characterized the plaintiff’s work as an 
idea, not an expression, and further concluded that even if the work 
was an expression, the expression is in the public domain.205  The 
concept employed by the plaintiff there may have been simplistic 
such that it warranted a “thin” copyright in which the defendant’s 
variation would not infringe, but the court focused upon the 
particular expression without entertaining how the author’s role 
should impact the ultimate determination of copyrightability.  This 
type of tunnel vision illustrates the need to reorient copyright law 
toward the front-end, author-focused approach. 
V. THE FRONT-END APPROACH SHOULD BE THE STANDARD 
FOLLOWED BY THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE AND COURTS AS THE METHOD 
OF EVALUATING ORIGINALITY IN VISUAL WORKS 
Having established that certain elements are overlooked in the 
end-product approach and that these oversights lead to disparate 
treatment between photography and graphic works, a stream-lined 
application better analyzes visual works for the minimal level of 
originality needed for a copyright.  This section first highlights why 
the front-end approach is more appropriate and not an 
overextension of copyright protection.  Furthermore, this Comment 
recommends an abandonment of the originality presumptions within 
photography that have detracted from the front-end approach 
because a true application of the front-end approach better informs 
copyright owners and others who wish to use similar content as to the 
actual scope of copyright protection in a given work. 
 
 202. See discussion supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text (recounting the 
allegation that the Postal Service infringed a heart-shaped picture of the Earth by its 
design of the stamp in which the court ultimately concluded the plaintiff’s work was 
not copyrightable). 
 203. Meade, 27 Fed. Cl. at 370–72. 
 204. Id. at 372; see supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text (elaborating on the 
idea-expression dichotomy). 
 205. See Meade, 27 Fed. Cl. at 372 (declaring the existence of heart-shaped maps 
and pictures of the Earth for centuries). 
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A. The Front-end Approach Is Appropriate for Visual Works Because 
Hindsight Plays a Lesser Role and the Scope of Protection  
Is Still Dictated by Originality 
Although both approaches are methods of evaluating the creativity 
mandated by Feist, the front-end approach is the better method of 
evaluation.  First, the front-end approach comports with the 
judiciary’s longstanding desire to refrain from evaluating art and 
aesthetic qualities.206  Due to the subjective nature of art, especially 
fine art, courts would be treading on shaky footing to define what art 
is and what is “good” art worthy of legal protection.207  The 
assessment of art rightly should be left to society at large, not legally-
focused judges. 
Furthermore, the front-end approach eliminates the natural 
inclination for hindsight to cloud the evaluation of creativity.  Some 
patent cases have recognized the problem of hindsight.208 Once a 
person sees the finished product, that result often seems typical or 
obvious.  Therefore, grasping too strongly upon the adjectives in Feist 
that explained why the directory was not original209 will lead 
copyright into the same pitfall of failing to identify creativity in a work 
that seems minimally creative when posed before you. 
Although the front-end approach will likely result in protection of 
works that the end-product approach would exclude, the protection 
granted to compilations is so limited in scope that others’ abilities to 
create similar works will not be impinged.210  Granting copyright 
protection to a work does not give the author exclusive rights over 
the choices the author made in arriving at the finished work.  The 
copyright protection lies only in the tangible form.211  Considering 
the mental processes of the author simply enables a more holistic 
evaluation of the creativity involved.  The front-end approach does 
 206. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) 
(describing the situation of a person trained in the law acting as final judge on the 
worth of pictorial works as dangerous).  See generally Farley, supra note 5. 
 207. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (“Individual perception of the 
beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art”). 
 208. See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting the ease 
of understanding an invention might lead a person “to fall victim to the insidious 
effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the inventor taught is used 
against its teacher” (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 
1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). 
 209. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361–63 
(1991) (allowing for a misconstruing of the necessary quantum of creativity with 
wording like “entirely typical,” “garden-variety,” and “practically inevitable”). 
 210. See generally Shipley, supra note 120 (articulating that protection of works of 
thin authorship is limited but still useful and worthwhile for owners of such 
copyrights). 
 211. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
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not have to resume the principles of the “sweat of the brow” doctrine 
as Karjala’s terminology “sweat of the brain” implies.212  
Consideration of the mental processes of the author simply addresses 
creative choice; the originality would not extend to the unprotectable 
elements of the larger work.213
B. Courts and the Copyright Office Should Abandon Presumptions of 
Originality Because These Presumptions Ignore the Small Class of Works  
that May Lack Originality and Do Not Provide Adequate Notice  
of What Elements of a Work Are Copyrighted 
The front-end approach, however, should not digress into a  
basic  presumption  as  seen  in  many  photography  cases.214   In fact, 
photography needs more scrutiny.  Why should copyright law not 
involve a basic presumption that a work has the required amount of 
creativity?  First, the language of the statute clearly indicates some 
works will not meet the creativity requirement.215  Second, copyright 
protection exists when two elements are present:  an author and 
originality.216  The end-product approach divorces consideration of 
these two elements and their interplay, resulting in an overly 
mechanical view of originality.  Finally, focusing upon the author’s 
choices allows for a fuller consideration of creativity by the inclusion 
of the selections made by the creator and includes scrutiny not 
present in some photography cases.217  The lack of scrutiny results in 
overprotection in some photographs because, based upon a 
presumption of originality, courts do not distinguish the 
copyrightable elements in a photograph from the non-copyrightable 
 212. Supra notes 186–188 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text (pointing out the limitation 
upon copyright protection in a work to expressions, not ideas, and only the original 
aspects within the work, not necessarily the whole work). 
 214. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 204 (postulating that Bleistein effectuated 
the demise of a meaningful threshold for the originality requirement); Farley, supra 
note 69, at 447–50 (arguing that the Romantic view of an aesthetic author producing 
a photograph continues to pervade photography jurisprudence). 
 215. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a compilation as materials or data 
“selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way . . . [as to result in] an original work 
of authorship[,]” thereby allowing for the possibility that a work might be arrange in 
such a way so that it would not warrant copyright protection) (emphasis added); supra 
note 32 (highlighting Feist’s specific reference to the statute’s allowance for a class of 
works to lack adequate originality for copyright protection). 
 216. Supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(adopting the prevailing view that almost any photograph has the necessary 
originality because of the photographer’s personal choices); Pagano v. Chas. Beseler 
Co., 234 F. 963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (reasoning that anyone may take a photograph 
of a public building and that the act of taking a photograph “undoubtedly requires 
originality” which allows one to conclude that any photograph of a building would be 
original). 
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elements.  To avoid overprotection and underprotection, graphic 
works and photography need more than a passing statement in 
Copyright Office determinations and judicial opinions regarding 
originality.218  As seen in Bridgeman, some courts are already 
embracing this greater, and more appropriate, scrutiny of 
photography by acknowledging some photographs lack the requisite 
creativity.219  These decisions demonstrate that the door is still open 
for some works to fall below the copyright standard as Feist and Sarony 
emphasized.220
Removing a presumption or perfunctory announcement of 
originality in visual works will lead to greater clarity as to the scope of 
particular copyrights for the owners, as well as others who would like 
to use of that work or some of its elements.  Applying the front-end 
approach, judges can more deliberately articulate the finding, or lack 
thereof, of originality within a work.221  Based upon the exceedingly 
low threshold for sufficient originality, identifying some of the 
indicators of originality within a work will not be burdensome for 
courts and will further direct courts into a more stream-lined 
approach to finding originality.222  Returning to the Mona Lisa 
 218. See Thomas G. Field, Jr., When the Copyright Office Hides the Ball, IPFRONTLINE, 
July 2, 2008, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=19701&deptid=4 
(hypothesizing that the concern in Darden was actually utility but pointing out that 
was not discussed); cf. id. (stating that sometimes the Copyright Office cites a lack of 
originality for rejecting copyright registration and then the courts go along even 
though the courts’ “concern seems to lie elsewhere”). 
 219. See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d on reh’g, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (qualifying that, 
although there is an inherent creativity in the art of photography, a photograph 
which is simply a copy of another’s work that is “as exact as science and technology 
permit[s] lacks originality”); see also Caratzas v. Time Life, Inc., No. 92 Cir. 6346 
(PKL), 1992 WL 322033, at *4. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992) (asserting that a 
photographer cannot acquire a copyright in images of public objects). 
 220. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991) 
(surmising that the § 101 definition of a compilation, based upon the phase “in such 
a way” envisions that some fact-based works will merit protection while others will 
not); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (theorizing the 
possibility of an “ordinary production of a photograph” not warranting copyright 
protection but explicitly declining to decide on the matter). 
 221. See Farley, supra note 5, at 846 (arguing that judges intuitively apply aesthetic 
theories without acknowledgement and generally with suppression of the approach 
taken). 
 222. Although judicial explanation of what is original may require more words 
and attention than the opinions discussed in this Comment, this level of analysis is 
not highly technical nor does it require more scrutiny than other legal issues.  In 
fact, some courts are already providing the level of specificity recommended in other 
copyright cases.  See infra note 224 (pointing to a sculpture case as an appropriate 
example of the level of analysis needed to inform owners and the public as to the 
limits of a copyright). 
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problem,223 courts should more clearly articulate that a copyright 
holder in either the photograph or promotional poster does not have 
exclusive rights to the expression of the Mona Lisa but only to the 
particular aspects, such as particular shading, positioning, or 
embellishment.224  If copyright law adopts the reasoning of 
Bridgeman225 and finds the photograph of the Mona Lisa 
uncopyrightable, then the promotional poster should also be 
uncopyrightable.   
In conclusion, the Copyright Office and courts need to refocus 
their determinations of originality upon actual analysis of the 
creativity within the visual work.  Photography, therefore, needs 
greater scrutiny than it currently receives while graphic works need 
less.  These changes will place the fields of photography and graphic 
works under the same front-end standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts seem to perpetuate an antiquated view of photography as a 
magical capturing of something ephemeral and non-existent. 
Graphic design is as equally planned and considered as photography, 
but the case law within graphic design, especially in maps and layout, 
has less sweeping language embracing the artistic nature of the 
medium.  Despite Feist’s emphasis upon creativity as the basis for 
copyright protection, two approaches exist for the assessment of the 
 223. See discussion supra Introduction (hypothesizing a composition of the Mona 
Lisa painting on a red background in both the photographic and graphic print 
mediums). 
224. Courts may look to the field of sculpture for a good model of this type of 
detailed analysis.  In Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003), the court clearly 
delineates the aspects of the lifelike glass-in-glass sculptures of jellyfish.  First the 
court articulated what elements of the allegedly infringed work were factual and 
thereby uncopyrightable.  See id. at 810–11 (removing the physiology of the jellyfish 
and the glass-in-glass medium from potential copyright protection, as well as the 
depiction of the jellyfish swimming vertically).  The court then found the only 
copyrightable aspects to be “the distinctive curls of particular tendrils; the 
arrangement of certain hues; [and] the unique shape of jellyfishes’ bells” to the 
extent they are not controlled by the species itself or the medium.  Id. at 812.  The 
court concluded that the copyright is “thin” and would likely prevent only identical 
copying.  Id.  If the court did not provide the analysis of the sculpture and simply 
declared a thin copyright, however, the public at large would be losing the much 
needed perspective to know what a copyright notice attached to a work actually 
indicates.  Suppose the sculptor includes a copyright notice with his subsequent 
sculptures based upon his thin copyright.  Without adequate case law explicating 
what a copyright in such a work actually entails, another sculptor intending to move 
into that genre may infer greater restrictions upon what elements of the first work 
she may include within her own. 
 225. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (describing how Bridgeman 
found straight-on photographs of artwork as lacking the requisite originality because 
the photographs did nothing more than a copier machine). 
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requisite creativity.  The front-end approach has predominated in 
photography whereas the end-product approach prevails in graphic 
design cases. Unfortunately, the two approaches can result in 
contrary conclusions.  Because the end-product approach is more 
restrictive in finding originality, a disparity has resulted that means 
the copyrightability of works comprised of essentially the same 
components depends upon the medium used. 
Courts’ initial reactions play a major role in the assessment of 
copyright protection.  A quick recognition of pictorial quality can 
result in an easy finding of originality.  Based upon the extremely low 
threshold, such a quick summation is not surprising or necessarily 
refutable.  However, the blanket assumption of a pictorial quality in 
photography creates a disparity in copyright protection for works of 
graphic design, like maps, which may not emit that immediate 
pictorial or aesthetic quality but may still employ creative choice.  
Those works that “scream” their pictorial nature get cursory review 
while the more subtle are being categorized as compilations and 
subjected to review more akin to the patent standard of novelty than 
the copyright standard of originality.  Professor Christine Haight 
Farley has noted that “photographs are at once able to be seen as the 
expression of the photographer who made it, but also as a direct 
transcription of nature.”226  In order to streamline copyright 
protection for visual works, the dual nature of other visual works must 
also gain such recognition. 
 
 226. Farley, supra note 69, at 393. 
